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Summary 
Social media played a central role in shaping political debates in 
the Arab Spring. A spike in online revolutionary conversations often 
preceded major events on the ground. Social media helped spread 
democratic ideas across international borders. 
 
Main Findings 
No one could have predicted that 
Mohammed Bouazizi would play a role 
in unleashing a wave of protest for 
democracy in the Arab world.  Yet, after 
the young vegetable merchant stepped 
in front of a municipal building in 
Tunisia and set himself on fire in protest 
of the government on December 17, 
2010, democratic fervor spread across 
North Africa and the Middle East.  
Governments in Tunisia and Egypt soon 
fell, civil war broke out in Libya, and 
protestors took to the streets in Algeria, 
Morocco, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere.   
 
The Arab Spring had many causes.  One 
of these sources was social media and 
its power to put a human face on 
political oppression.  Bouazizi’s self 
immolation was one of several stories 
told and retold on Facebook, Twitter, 
and YouTube in ways that inspired 
dissidents to organize protests, criticize 
their governments, and spread ideas 
about democracy.  Until now, most of 
what we have known about the role of 
social media in the Arab Spring has 
been anecdotal.   
 
Focused mainly on Tunisia and Egypt, 
this research included creating a unique 
database of information collected from 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.  The 
research also included creating maps of 
important Egyptian political Websites, 
examining political conversations in the 
Tunisian blogosphere, analyzing more 
than 3 million Tweets based on key-
words used, and tracking which 
countries thousands of individuals 
Tweeted from during the revolutions.  
The result is that for the first time we 
have evidence confirming social 
media’s critical role in the Arab Spring.   
 
Our research has produced three key 
findings:   
 
First, social media played a central role 
in shaping political debates in the Arab 
Spring. 
 
Our evidence shows that social media 
was used heavily to conduct political 
conversations by a key demographic 
group in the revolution – young, urban, 
relatively well educated individuals, 
many of whom were women.  Both 
before and during the revolutions, these 
individuals used Facebook, Twitter, and 
YouTube to put pressure on their 
governments.  In some cases, they used 
new technologies in creative ways such 
as in Tunisia where democracy 
advocates embarrassed President Zine 
El Abidine Ben Ali by streaming video of 
his wife using a government jet to make 
expensive shopping trips to Europe.   
 
Bloggers also used the Internet to 
publish information critical of the 
governments in Egypt and Tunisia.  And 
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our evidence suggests that political 
organizations and individuals used 
Western news sites – such as the BBC 
and CNN – to spread credible 
information to their supporters through 
the revolutionary period.  The result was 
that, by using digital technologies, 
democracy advocates created a 
freedom meme that took on a life of its 
own and spread ideas about liberty and 
revolution to a surprisingly large number 
of people.  Interestingly, not a single 
Egyptian political Website we mapped 
linked to regional news sources such as 
Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya before the 
revolution.   
 
Second, a spike in online revolutionary 
conversations often preceded major 
events on the ground. 
 
Determining whether online 
conversations were driving street 
protests or whether the presence of a 
large volume of people in the streets 
was feeding an ongoing online 
conversation can be difficult.  However, 
our evidence suggests that online 
conversations played an integral part in 
the revolutions that toppled 
governments in Egypt and Tunisia.  We 
find that conversations about liberty, 
democracy, and revolution on blogs and 
on Twitter often immediately preceded 
mass protests.  In Tunisia, for example, 
20 percent of blogs were evaluating 
Ben Ali’s leadership on the day he 
resigned from office (January 14), up 
from just 5 percent the month before.  
Subsequently, the primary topic for 
Tunisian blogs was “revolution” until a 
public rally of at least 100,000 people 
took place and eventually forced the old 
regime’s remaining leaders to relinquish 
power.  
 
Governments themselves also 
recognized the power of opposition 
movements equipped with social media.  
In Tunisia, officials attempted to block 
Facebook and other social media sites 
and arrested bloggers and others who 
used social media to spread critical 
news about the government.  What they 
found is that democracy advocates 
were tech-savvy and had the help of 
hackers and talented computer 
programmers who were able to shutter 
government services online and provide 
protestors with workarounds to censors.  
Likewise, Egypt attempted to choke off 
access to social media and found that 
the protestors in Cairo’s Tahrir Square 
were nonetheless able to stay 
connected.  The Muslim Brotherhood 
relied on bloggers whose servers were 
located in London and therefore 
couldn’t be taken offline.  
 
Third, social media helped spread 
democratic ideas across international 
borders.   
 
Our evidence suggests that democracy 
advocates in Egypt and Tunisia used 
social media to connect with others 
outside their countries.  In many cases, 
these connections helped inform 
Western news stories about events on 
the ground, which in turn spread news 
about ongoing events throughout the 
region.  In many other cases, we find 
that democracy advocates in Egypt and 
Tunisia picked up followers in other 
countries, where similar democratic 
protests would later erupt.  Ultimately, 
social media brought a cascade of 
messages about freedom and 
democracy across North Africa and the 
Middle East, and helped raise 
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expectations for success of political 
uprising. 
 
Twitter offers us the clearest evidence 
of where individuals engaging in 
democratic conversations were located 
during the revolutions.  We find that 
there were over 2,200 tweets from 
Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, and 
Yemen about Ben Ali’s resignation on 
the day he stepped aside.  Over the 
course of a week before Mubarak’s 
resignation, the total rate of tweets from 
Egypt—and around the world—about 
political change in that country 
ballooned from 2,300 a day to 230,000 
a day.  Interestingly, the relative 
contribution of people not living in the 
region diminished significantly over this 
period.  On the day Mubarak left office, 
February 11, there were more than 
225,000 Tweets outside the country 
that spread the news of his departure.   
In the two weeks after Mubarak’s 
resignation, there were an average of 
3,400 tweets a day about the political 
crisis in Egypt by people living in 
neighboring countries.   
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Opening Closed Regimes 
What Was the Role of Social Media During the Arab Spring? 
 
Main Report 
Over the past century, the world has 
witnessed waves of democratization 
sweep into sometimes surprising 
places.  The last such great wave 
toppled the Berlin Wall and brought 
democracy to formerly communist 
countries in Eastern Europe and other 
parts of the globe.  By 2010, even 
though some countries had slipped 
back toward dictatorship, approximately 
three fifths of the world’s countries were 
governed by some form of democracy.1  
And in 2011, a new wave was sweeping 
into a region that had remained notably 
devoid of democracy: North Africa and 
the Middle East.  
 
Between January and April 2011 public 
demand for political reform cascaded 
from Tunis to Cairo, Sana’a, Amman 
and Manama. This inspired people in 
Casablanca, Damascus, Tripoli and 
dozens of smaller cities to take to the 
streets to demand change.  By May, the 
political casualties were significant: 
Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and 
Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, two of the 
region’s most recalcitrant dictators, 
were gone; Libya was locked in a civil 
war; and several constitutional 
monarchs had sacked their cabinets 
and committed themselves to 
constitutional reforms.  Other 
governments sought to quell unrest by 
promising vast expenditures on 
infrastructure projects, unemployment 
benefits, food subsidies, and salary 
                                                     
1 Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2010 
Edition. 
increases for civil servants and military 
personnel.  
 
Morocco and Saudi Arabia appeared to 
fend off serious domestic uprisings, but 
the outcomes for regimes in Bahrain, 
Jordan, Syria, and Yemen remain far 
from certain. Democratization 
movements had existed long before 
technologies such as mobile phones 
and the Internet came to these 
countries. But technologies have helped 
people interested in democracy build 
extensive networks, create social 
capital, and organize political action.  
Technology may not have created the 
desire for political freedom, but it is a 
tool democracy advocates have used to 
their advantage. 
 
Egypt and Tunisia’s Tech-
Savvy Democrats 
One reason why technology has been an 
effective tool for democracy advocates 
in Tunisia and Egypt is that both 
countries have relatively young, tech-
savvy populations.  In Tunisia, where the 
median age is 30 years old, 
approximately 23 percent of the 10 
million people who live there are under 
the age of 14.  In Egypt, where the 
median age is 24, 33 percent of the 
country’s 83 million inhabitants is under 
14.  Cell phone use is widespread in 
both countries, with 93 mobile phone 
subscribers for every 100 people in 
Tunisia and 67 mobile phones for every 
100 people in Egypt.  What’s more, in 
both countries the government has 
censured the media, giving individuals a 
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strong incentive to turn to the Internet 
for credible sources of information.  
Internet use in both countries is also 
significant.  About 25 percent of the 
population in Tunisia and 10 percent of 
the population in Egypt has used the 
Internet at least once, with much of the 
use concentrated among young people.  
Some 66 percent of the Internet-savvy 
population in Tunisia, and 70 percent in 
Egypt, is under the age of 34.  All of this 
might explain why many of the people 
who took to the streets earlier this year 
were young, technologically inclined 
individuals who blogged, Tweeted, or 
posted to Facebook news events as 
they unfolded.2  
 
In addition to enabling young people to 
organize, technology has facilitated the 
growing participation of women in 
political conversations.  Forty-one 
percent of Tunisia’s Facebook 
population is female and 36 percent of 
Egypt’s Facebook population is female.  
Women also participate actively in 
political conversations over Twitter, and 
were notably present in street 
gatherings in both Tunisia and Egypt.  
Indeed, through social media, women 
like Esraa Abdel Fattah of the Egyptian 
Democratic Academy became vocal 
opponents, and Leil-Zahra Mortada, 
documented women’s involvement in 
the revolution with a popular Facebook 
album.   
 
Our unique dataset of Twitter 
conversations in Tunisia and Egypt 
reveals that women were quite active 
during the uprisings.  By distinguishing 
                                                     
2 Demographic data from the CIA World Factbook 
and World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database.  Technology use data from the 
International Telecommunications Union. 
between people Tweeting in-country 
from those using the same hashtags 
(key words) but Tweeting outside the 
country, we were able to determine that 
30 percent of the people actively 
contributing to Twitter conversations 
inside of Tunisia were women.  Women 
made up 33 percent of the people 
actively Tweeting inside Egypt during 
the revolution.   
 
Voices of Freedom and 
Dissent Online 
Even before the revolutions, Tunisia and 
Egypt had active blogospheres.  Often 
the most critical coverage of 
government abuse was done not by 
newspaper reporters, but by average 
citizens using their access to the 
Internet in creative ways.  Most famous 
in Tunisia was the graphically simple 
video of the president’s plane arriving 
and leaving Europe’s elite shopping 
destinations with his wife as the only 
passenger.  Since the online publication 
of that video in August 2007, the 
regime had variously cracked down on 
YouTube, Facebook, and other online 
applications.   
 
In Egypt, democracy advocates 
benefited from the fact that Cairo is not 
only a cultural hub, it is also a media 
center with a reasonably robust 
information infrastructure.  This has 
enabled the city’s politically disaffected, 
but still active, youth and others to build 
a vibrant public sphere online.  Over the 
past several years, political parties and 
social movements have become 
particularly adept at using social media 
to their advantage.  The Muslim 
Brotherhood, for example, used the 
Internet to share information, organize 
In addition to enabling 
young people to organize, 
technology has facilitated 
the growing participation of 
women in political 
conversation. 
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supporters, and conduct other activities 
that helped it challenge secular 
authorities.  
 
In response, the governments in Tunisia 
and Egypt arrested bloggers, tracked 
online conversations, and shuttered 
Websites and Internet access.  For 
example, in 2005 Egyptian blogger 
Abdolkarim Nabil Seliman was arrested 
and imprisoned for four years after 
criticizing President Hosni Mubarak and 
the state’s religious institutions.  In 
2007, a number of bloggers were 
arrested for organizing and covering 
social protests when the Egyptian 
parliament approved controversial 
constitutional amendments.  Many 
activist Egyptian bloggers, some 
affiliated with groups such as Kefaya 
and the April 6 Movement, were 
arrested and faced physical abuse.  
 
Egyptian bloggers proved particularly 
resilient in continuing to publish critical 
information online.  But in both Tunisia 
and Egypt a cottage industry of bloggers 
and activists used the Internet to evade 
government censorship by creating 
alternative newscasts and building 
spaces online where individuals could 
publish information critical of the 
government without attaching their 
names to it.  Online activists and 
bloggers, digital news organizations, 
and political party Websites form a 
virtual ecology of civil society groups 
that debate contentious issues.  In 
many cases, the boundaries between 
these organizations are blurred for 
important reasons.  For example, 
banned political parties, such as Egypt’s 
Muslim Brotherhood, have relied on 
bloggers who maintain servers located 
outside of the country and thereby 
couldn’t be taken offline by the 
government.   
 
Egypt has a number of active political 
parties, many of which maintain 
Websites and online newsletters to 
communicate with their supporters and 
constituents, but also with each other.  
Almost all major parties publish online 
newspapers, such as the New Wafd 
Party’s Al Wafd Daily, the National 
Progressive Unionist Party’s Al-Ahali 
newspaper, the Arab Democratic 
Nasserist Party’s Al-Arabi weekly, and 
the Tomorrow Party’s Al Ghad weekly.  
In addition to the discussion spaces 
fostered by newspapers, party-
publications like these allow for active 
opportunities for cross-party, political 
negotiation.  The Muslim Brotherhood 
had been banned by the government, 
but nonetheless used Arabic and 
English language publications to 
maintain an equal, if not more 
prominent, presence in online Egyptian 
politics than many legally sanctioned 
parties. 
 
Before the Arab Spring, Twitter had a 
loyal following of users in Tunisia and 
Egypt, living mostly in the largest cities.  
While records of Twitter conversations 
in both countries prior to the revolutions 
are not available, in most parts of the 
world we know that Twitter is used by 
networks of family and friends to trade 
jokes and talk about everyday life.  
Facebook became a political tool 
because people found it useful for 
amassing content and building links to 
like-minded individuals.  The Tunisian 
government was more active than the 
Egyptian regime when it came to 
restricting social media.  In 2007, for 
example, it blocked YouTube and 
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DailyMotion for an extended period and 
in 2008 it blocked Facebook for a 
month.  In both cases, observers 
suspected that the regime was reacting 
to fears that social media were 
strengthening the bonds of 
communication between citizens in 
ways not easily monitored and managed 
by the state. 
 
Western news media were quick to label 
the political uprisings as “Twitter” and 
“Facebook” revolutions.  To prepare this 
report, we sought the latest data on 
trends in technology use to help shed 
light on the actual role of the Internet 
and social media in Tunisia and Egypt. 
 
Tunisia – From Oppression 
to Resistance to Spark for 
the Region 
On December 17, 2010, Mohamed 
Bouazizi set himself on fire.  This young 
street vendor had tried in vain to fight 
an inspector’s small fine, appealing first 
to the police, then to municipal 
authorities, and then to the region’s 
governor.  At each appeal he had been 
physically beaten by security officials.  
Bruised, humiliated and frustrated by an 
unresponsive bureaucracy and a 
thuggish security apparatus, Bouazizi 
set himself alight in front of a local 
government office.  By the time he died 
in a hospital on January 4, protests had 
spread to cities throughout the country.  
It is not enough to say that news of 
Bouazizi’s tragedy travelled quickly, 
because the state-run media did not 
cover the tragedy or the simmering 
anger over political oppression in the 
city of Sidi Bouzid, where Bouazizi self 
immolated.  Networks of family and 
friends, feeling sympathy for the dying 
man’s plight, came to realize that they 
shared common grievances.  The 
recognition came as people watched 
and uploaded YouTube videos about the 
abusive state, read foreign news 
coverage of political corruption online, 
and shared jokes about their aging 
dictators over social media sites.  In the 
end, social media helped people 
develop strategies to overthrow their 
president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.  
 
Ben Ali’s critics dominated virtual 
spaces, but after Bouazizi’s death, they 
took to occupying public spaces. 
Shamseddine Abidi, a 29-year old 
interior designer, posted regular videos 
and updates to Facebook.  Al Jazeera 
used the content to carry news of 
events to the world.  Images of Bouazizi, 
hospitalized with burns, passed along 
networks of family and friends.  An 
aggressive Internet campaign called on 
fellow citizens and unions to set up 
committees to support the uprising in 
Sidi Bouzid.  Lawyers and student 
unions were among the first to take to 
the streets in an organized way. 
 
The government tried to ban Facebook, 
Twitter and video sites such as 
DailyMotion and YouTube. But within a 
few days, social media networks were 
the organizing tool of choice.  Less than 
20 percent of the overall population 
actively used social-media Websites, 
but almost everyone had access to a 
mobile phone.  Outside the country, the 
hacker communities of Anonymous and 
Telecomix helped cripple government 
operations with their “Operation 
Tunisia” denial-of-service attacks, and 
by building software activists used to 
get around state firewalls.  
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The government responded with a 
counter-insurgency strategy against its 
tech-savvy opponents that included 
jailing a group of bloggers in early 
January.  For the most part, however, 
the political uprising was leaderless so 
there was no long-standing 
revolutionary figurehead, traditional 
opposition leader, or charismatic 
speechmaker who could be arrested.   
 
But there were prominent nodes in the 
digital networks, people whose 
contributions held sway and mobilized 
turnout.  Slim Amamou, a member of 
the copyright focused “Pirate Party,” 
blogged the revolution (and later took a 
post in the national unity government). 
Sami ben Gharbia, a Tunisian exile, 
monitored online censorship attempts 
and advertised workarounds.  “El 
Général,” a middle-class Tunisian 
rapper, streamed digital “soundtracks 
for the revolution.”  
 
By early January, protestors’ appeals for 
help and clumsily recorded mobile 
phone videos were streaming across 
North Africa and protests in Algeria and 
other countries started to crop up.  By 
the time Ben Ali fled Tunisia on January 
14, active campaigns for civil 
disobedience against authoritarian rule 
were growing in Jordan, Oman, and 
Yemen.  In other countries, such as 
Lebanon, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia and 
the Sudan, minor protests erupted on a 
range of issues and triggered quick 
concessions or had little impact.  But 
even in these countries opposition 
leaders appeared to draw inspiration 
from what they were tracking in Tunisia.  
Moreover, opposition leaders across the 
region were learning the digital tricks for 
how to catch ruling elites off guard. 
Soon events in Tunisia would help 
inspire the largest protests in Cairo in 
30 years. 
 
Social media brought a cascade of 
messages about freedom and 
democracy across North Africa and the 
Middle East and helped raise public 
expectations for the success of political 
uprising.  Two kinds of evidence reveal 
much about this cascade: the rhythm of 
Tweets about political change and the 
topical evolution of blog posts.   
 
The rhythm of Tweets is significant 
because it gives us a window into 
conversations taking placed over the 
broad digital spectrum. The vast 
majority of conversations likely involved 
using cell phones to send text and other 
type of messages, but there isn’t a good 
database for studying that information.  
There is, however, a robust set of data 
for conversations that take place over 
Twitter, so in a sense Twitter can serve 
as a proxy for understanding the types 
of conversation that happened on other 
forms of digital communication.   
 
And what we can see on Twitter is that a 
large volume of people—both inside 
each country as well as across the 
globe—were following events as they 
unfolded.  Twitter seems to have been a 
key tool in the region for raising 
expectations of success and 
coordinating strategy.  Twitter also 
seems to have been the key media for 
spreading immediate news about big 
political changes from country to 
country in the region.  As a group, 
Twitter users are probably more 
educated and wealthy than the average 
person, and more likely to be found in 
major cities.  They are also, 
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consequently, opinion leaders for whom 
Twitter served as an important means 
of carrying on an extended conversation 
about the prospects for liberty and the 
logistics of social action. 
 
In total, there were 13,262 Tweets 
using the hashtag most prominently 
associated with Tunisia’s political 
uprising—#sidibouzid.  On average, 
throughout the study period of January 
14 to March 16, 18 percent of the 
Tweets about the Tunisian uprising 
came from inside Tunisia, 8 percent 
from neighboring countries, and 32 
percent from outside the region.  The 
remainder offered no location 
information.  The day Ben Ali resigned, 
2,200 tweets from Algeria, Bahrain, 
Egypt, Morocco, and Yemen concerned 
the uprising in Tunisia.  Many Tweets 
involved personal stories of suffering at 
the hands of a tough and incompetent 
regime.  Some involved links to critical 
documentaries on YouTube, or made 
reference to Facebook groups and news 
stories that did not paint the regime in a 
flattering light. 
 
Beginning with the earliest available 
records of Twitter feeds in Tunisia, it is 
possible to graph waves of political 
consciousness with key events and 
protestor turnout. Figure 1 identifies the 
number of active Twitter users 
contributing to one of the most 
important hashtags of the time, 
#sidibouzid.  The number of users 
appears on a logarithmic scale, day-by-
day.  A blue bar indicates the dates on 
which journalists began reporting that 
attendance at street protests had 
reached into the thousands.  In Tunisia, 
the number of contributions increased 
steadily between late January and late 
February.  The number of people with 
no location information also declined, 
suggesting that as time passed 
Tunisians grew more willing to note 
publicly that they were Tweeting from 
inside Tunisia during the heady days of 
political change. 
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Figure 1 tracks the rhythm of Tweets on 
the topic of political change.  It also 
reveals the moments when the service 
was either overloaded or mobile 
networks were under attack (or both).  
Before Ben Ali resigned, more than a 
thousand people in Tunisia and around 
the world were Tweeting each day about 
political change in that country.  
Immediately after his resignation, 
Twitter service declined precipitously, 
with activists in the country reporting 
that security forces were interfering with 
communication networks.  When the 
service returned to normal, Twitter 
traffic peaked again, with a thousand 
Tweets a day in Tunisia and street 
protests drawing tens of thousands of 
people.  Tweets and protests lasted for 
several weeks, until the last vestiges of 
the ruling elite were removed from 
power. 
 
Figure 1: Logged Number of Tweets on #sidibouzid, by Location 
 
Notes: “Outside Country” refers to Twitter profiles that had locations outside both the country and the region, and 
“No location” refers to profiles that either had no location data or had have been deleted or suspended since 
archiving began. The blue bar indicates the period in which journalists began reporting that protests had reached 
the level of “thousands” of participants. 
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Figure 2 tracks six of the most 
important keywords in the Tunisian 
blogosphere.  Just as Twitter traffic 
peaked with street protest, the topics 
discussed in the Tunisian blogosphere 
closely tracked with public interest in 
political freedom. Analysis of the 
structure of content and links in the 
Tunisian blogosphere between 
November 2010 and May 2011 
indicates direct parallels between online 
political conversations and offline 
events. Particularly after December 17, 
2010, when Bouazizi set himself on fire, 
the Tunisian blogosphere experienced a 
spike in the frequency of online 
conversations about liberty, revolution, 
and President Ben Ali’s leadership.  In 
this way, the volume of digital 
conversations peaks with the size of 
street demonstrations, and the content 
of these conversations directly reflects 
public sentiments. 
 
Tunisian bloggers had, for several years, 
been among the most critical opponents 
of Ben Ali’s regime. By scanning the 
structure of content and links of the 
Tunisian blogosphere, we can chart the 
progress of the idea of political reform.  
Many Tunisian bloggers wrote in French 
and Arabic.  Moreover, distinct 
Figure 2: Percent of Tunisian Blogs With Posts on Politics, By Keyword 
 
Note: Figure represents the percent of all blog posts containing at least one of six keywords. Based on data 
captured through eCairn beginning November 20, 2010. 
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keywords and themes regarding 
economic grievances and 
democratization arose preceding the 
popular uprising.   
 
Among Tunisia’s digerati, economic 
woes and Ben Ali’s leadership are key 
topics from November to December.  
But with Bouazizi’s death in early 
January came a spike in conversation 
about his plight, and shortly thereafter a 
growth in the number of conversations 
about freedom and revolution.  Islam, 
as a political theme, tracks on only a 
few blogs and the interest in economic 
issues diminishes over time relative to 
themes of freedom and revolution.   
 
Talk about revolution continued even 
after Ben Ali fled the country, because 
his replacement, Mohamed 
Ghannouchi, was viewed by many as 
part of the old regime.  Consequently, 
the percent of blog posts with the 
keywords “revolution” and “liberty” 
peaked after Ben Ali had already left 
office.  By the third week of January, 18 
percent of all Tunisian blog posts talked 
about revolution; 10 percent discussed 
liberty.  That week marked the climax of 
protester turnout with estimates ranging 
from 40,000 to 100,000 people in the 
streets.   
 
The primary topic of political 
conversation in Tunisian blogs then 
became “revolution” until a public rally 
of at least 100,000 people on February 
27, after which Ghannouchi was forced 
to resign.  In Tunisia, the blogosphere 
anticipated what happened on the 
ground by days. Demand online for 
liberty eventually manifested itself in 
the streets.  
 
The relative prominence of 
conversations about freedom among 
Tunisia’s wired middle class is 
consistent with anecdotal evidence of 
public sentiment during the first few 
days of the uprising.  Journalists and 
country experts consistently expressed 
surprise that traditional political 
ideologies and political parties were 
absent from the protests.  Major 
opposition parties and political leaders 
did not feature as prominently as 
Bouazizi, and were not particularly 
associated with conversations about 
liberty or the prospects of revolution.  
And conversations about liberty and 
freedom were more important than 
conversations about Islam.  
 
Viral Democratic Values  
Around the region, people increasingly 
Tweeted about events that were 
occurring in their neighborhood.  Stories 
of success and difficulty spread widely 
and created a kind of “freedom meme.”  
The same meme traveled across the 
region through Facebook and YouTube, 
as inspiring images were captured by 
mobile phone and transmitted. 
 
Here we study Tweets, rather than 
simply Twitter users, because they 
represent a sense of conversation and 
active dialogue about freedom that 
transcended national boundaries.  For 
example, after Egyptians heard that Ben 
Ali fled Tunisia on January 14, Twitter 
user and journalist Gigi Ibrahim 
declared that “the Tunisian revolution is 
being twitterized ... history is being 
written by the people #sidibouzid 
#Tunisia.”  Blogger Tarek Shalaby 
echoed with, “we will follow it!” On 
January 25, journalist Hossam el-
Hamalawy noted that “tens of 
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thousands r protesting [with] the same 
chants as the Tunisians.”  In the 
aftermath of an unexpectedly large 
turnout in Egypt that day, Mahmoud 
Salem—the blogger and activist also 
known as “Sandmonkey”—urged his 
Twitter followers to “please remember, 
it took a month of protests 4 Tunis 
revolution 2 succeed. Persistence is 
everything.” 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the rising wave 
of Tweets about events in other 
countries and the prospects of making 
democratic gains.  To produce this 
graphic, we first selected all the Tweets 
we could confirm using our geolocation 
efforts as originating in Algeria, Bahrian, 
Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia or Yemen.  
Then we isolated the Tweets using 
hashtags for countries and freedom 
movements other than the one they 
were in.  In other words, this figure 
specifically displays the rate at which 
people in each country caught and 
transmitted the meme of political 
freedom from other countries.  In the 
two weeks after Mubarak’s resignation, 
there were an average of 3,400 tweets 
a day about the political crisis in Egypt 
Figure 3: Number of Tweets in the Region Using Hashtags for Neighboring Countries 
 
Notes: These are the hashtags that most prominently came to be associated with political uprisings in Algeria, 
Egypt, Bahrain, Tunisia, Morocco and Yemen. The hashtags analyzed, in order, were “#algeria”, “#egypt”, 
“#feb14”, “#morocco”, “#sidibouzid” and “#yemen.” 
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by people living in neighboring 
countries.   
 
This figure reveals that at the peak of 
events in Tunisia, there were 2,200 
tweets outside Tunisia but in the region 
about Ben Ali’s resignation.  In the 
subsequent months, the hashtags 
associated with conversations about 
political change in particular countries 
were often used by people in 
neighboring countries.  In other words, 
people in countries throughout the 
region were drawn into an extended 
conversation about social uprising.  As 
street protests arose in Tunisia and 
Egypt, then Yemen and Bahrain, and 
eventually Algeria and Morocco, people 
across the region tweeted in real time 
about big events.  This is significant 
because it reveals how the success of 
demands for political change in Tunisia 
and Egypt led individuals in other 
countries to pick up the conversation 
and talk about how it was relevant to 
their own lives.  In other words, it helped 
cascade conversation about freedom 
across the region. 
 
Egypt – The Freedom Meme 
Spreads Through Social 
Networks 
 News of Ben Ali’s departure spread 
rapidly in Egypt, where almost everyone 
has access to a mobile phone and the 
Internet-using population is the largest 
in the region outside of Iran.  State-run 
media in Egypt, which had been slow to 
report protests in the region and in 
Cairo, reluctantly covered Ben Ali’s exit.   
 
Like Tunisia, Egypt has long had a large 
and active online public sphere.  It is 
here that illegal political parties, radical 
fundamentalists, investigative 
journalists and disaffected citizens 
interacted.  When the Muslim 
Brotherhood's online news services 
were banned in Egypt, the organization 
moved its server infrastructure to 
London and kept up a flow of political 
spin. But it was not the established 
parties and unions that converted anti-
Mubarak vitriol into civil disobedience.  
It was the campaign to memorialize a 
murdered blogger.  
 
Wael Ghonim, a regional executive at 
Google, opened the Facebook group 
“We are All Khaled Said” to memorialize 
a young blogger whom police had 
beaten to death for exposing their 
corruption.  Just as digital images of 
Mohamed Bouazizi in the hospital 
passed over networks of family and 
friends in Tunisia, in Egypt an image of 
Khaled's bruised face taken as his body 
lay in a city morgue passed from one 
mobile phone to thousands.  “We are All 
Khaled Said” became a portal for 
collective commiseration.  But more 
than being a digital memorial — 
Egyptian police have long tormented 
bloggers — this Web page became a 
logistical tool, at least temporarily, to 
help organize democracy advocates.  
Ghonim also fast became the country’s 
most prominent Tweeter, linking a 
massive Egyptian social network writing 
in Arabic to networks of interested 
English-speaking observers abroad.  
 
The first occupants of Cairo’s Tahrir 
Square shared many of the hopes and 
aspirations of their counterparts in 
Tunis.  They were a community of like-
minded individuals, underemployed, 
educated, eager for change but not 
committed to religious fervor or a 
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specific political ideology. They found 
solidarity through social media, and 
then used their mobile phones to call 
their social networks into the street.  In 
a surprise to both government analysts 
and outsiders, a large network of 
relatively liberal, middle class, peaceful 
citizens quickly mobilize against 
Mubarak. The traditional Islamists, 
opposition parties, and union 
organizations were in the square too, 
but liberal and civil society voices 
dominated the digital conversation 
about events. News and speeches from 
Mubarak, President Barack Obama, and 
regional leaders were streamed live to 
mobile phones and laptops in the 
square.   
 
Mubarak tried to disconnect his citizens 
from the global information 
infrastructure in the last week of 
January. It was a desperate move and it 
failed.  A small group of tech-savvy 
students and civil society leaders stayed 
connected by organizing satellite 
phones and dialup connections to Israel 
and Europe.  There is also evidence to 
suggest that some of the people 
Mubarak relied on to shut down 
telecommunications systems 
deliberately acted slowly to choke off 
Internet access.  The first large Internet 
service provider was asked to shut 
down on Friday, January 28, but 
engineers didn’t act until Saturday.  
Other providers responded quickly but 
returned to normal service on Monday.  
The amount of bandwidth going into 
Egypt did drop for four days, but it was 
not the information blackout Mubarak 
had ordered.   
 
What’s more, taking down pieces of the 
nation’s information infrastructure 
crippled government agencies.  The 
people most affected were middle-class 
Egyptians, who were cut off from 
Internet service at home.  Some people 
apparently stayed there, isolated and 
uncertain about the status of their 
friends and family.  But in the absence 
of information about the crisis, others 
took to the streets.  Mubarak’s move to 
shut off the protestors may have 
bolstered their ranks as people filled 
the streets to find out what was 
happening.  
 
A few days later, the Egyptian security 
services began using Facebook and 
Twitter as a source of information for a 
counter-insurgency strategy.  They used 
social media alerts to anticipate the 
movements of individual activists.  They 
arrested Ghonim once his Facebook 
group topped 300,000 people.  But by 
then, the revolution was well underway.  
 
Events in Egypt not only helped to spark 
protest movements in neighboring 
countries, they also seeded a global 
conversation about the politics of 
freedom.  Twitter was used to draw the 
international community into Egyptian 
events.  Real-time conversations about 
protester turnout, regime response, and 
Mubarak’s political options did not just 
occur between Egyptians.  Figure 4 
tracks the active number of Twitter 
users contributing to the primary 
hashtag associated with the freedom 
movement in Egypt—#egypt.  
 
We find that as domestic and 
international pressure for Mubarak to 
resign was building, there was an 
interesting shift in the geolocation data 
of people Tweeting about political 
change in Egypt.  Two weeks prior to his 
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resignation, we find that 34 percent of 
the Tweets on the topic of political 
change in Egypt were coming from 
people who self-identified as being 
outside the region entirely.  But as 
public engagement with political protest 
grew in the week prior to his 
resignation, the relative contribution of 
outsiders dwindled to just 12 percent.  
In other words, the vast majority of 
Tweets were coming from people who 
were either in country, in the region, or 
had refused to give their location 
information (a common strategy for 
political protesters). 
 
The regime’s interference with digital 
networks interrupted online traffic on 
some days. Yet in-country Twitter traffic 
peaked on the day street protests 
reached into the thousands and then 
peaked again during the last days of 
Mubarak’s hold on power.  Over time 
the number of Egyptians in Egypt 
Tweeting about politics surpassed the 
number Tweeting from elsewhere in the 
region. 
Figure 4: Logged Number of Tweets on #egypt, by Location 
 
Notes: “Outside Region” refers to Twitter profiles that had locations outside both the country and the region, and 
“No Location” refers to profiles that either had no location data or have been deleted or suspended since 
archiving began. The blue bar indicates the period in which journalists began reporting that protests had reached 
the level of “thousands” of participants.  
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Social Media’s Centrality to 
Political Conversation  
Between November 2010 and May 
2011, the amount of content produced 
online by major Egyptian political actors 
increased significantly as they reacted 
to events on the street and adjusted 
strategy to compete for the affinities of 
newly freed Egyptian voters.  Some 
observers have been skeptical of social 
media’s relevance to the evolution of 
political conversations in Egypt.  But we 
find that in Egypt, Facebook and 
Western news media are central to 
online political discourse.  We mapped 
the digital space in Egypt twice, once in 
November 2010 and a second time in 
May 2011.  What we found was that 
Egypt’s major political actors often 
linked to social networking and news 
services.  In fact, major Egyptian 
political Websites were far more likely to 
link to Facebook or Western media like 
CNN than they were to each other.  For 
Egyptians, Facebook and other social 
media are not simply sites used for 
entertainment or managing their 
personal lives.  These social media are 
where Egyptians go to do politics.  
Political parties have learned this over 
the past few months, and are working 
hard to put new content online and 
connect with potential supporters — 
some of whom may be voters in 
upcoming elections. 
 
In November 2010, the Websites of 
major political actors had more links to 
Facebook and other Western media 
than they had to each other.  Over 20 
percent of the 928 links going out of 
Egyptian party Websites were to social 
media such as Facebook, YouTube, and 
Twitter, and to blogging tools or Western 
news Websites such as the BBC or CNN.  
By May 2011, however, this had 
dropped to 15 percent of 1,332 
outgoing links. Table 1 highlights the 
number of pages, unique external links, 
and overall size of the Websites of 
major political groups in Egypt, both 
Table 1: Online Structure of Egyptian Political Parties, Before and After Revolution 
 Before Revolution After Revolution 











April 6 Youth Movement, 6april.org .. .. .. 378 8 48 
Communist Party of Egypt*, cpegypt.tk 1,297 248 62 3,379 9 190 
Egyptian Greens, egyptiangreens.com 441 2 16 527 2 17 
Kefaya Movement*, harakamasria.org 4,372 90 24 4,522 78 25 
National Association for Change*, 
taghyeer.net 1,983 2 35 .. .. .. 
National Democratic Party, ndp.org.eg 1,343 11 43 .. .. .. 
New Wafd Party, alwafdparty.org 78 .. 9 2,015 11 165 
Progressive National Unionist Party, al-
ahaly.com 1,583 12 22 323 7 7 
Socialist Labour Party, el3amal.net 304 7 2 615 6 4 
Muslim Brotherhood (Arabic)*, 
ikhwanonline.com 6,123 66 137 7,948 67 459 
Muslim Brotherhood (English)*, 
ikhwanweb.com 4,372 896 196 4,579 739 386 
 
Note: Groups marked with an asterisk (*) were illegal political parties until recently.  
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before the revolution and after.  Groups 
that were unlicensed by Mubarak’s 
government are indicated with an 
asterisk (*). Both the number of pages 
and the volume (in megabytes) are good 
indicators of the overall size of the 
Website, though the first may be a good 
measure of text content and the second 
a measure of multimedia content.  The 
number of unique external links is a 
good indicator of how much a political 
party connects its ideas and content to 
larger political conversations.  
 
The network structure of Egypt’s online 
political parties and pressure groups, 
along with the unique external Websites 
originating from a group’s homepage, is 
mapped in Figures 5 and 6. The shaded 
circle around a group’s origin node 
represents the volume of pages within 
that site (the diameter of each circle 
directly represents the amount of 
content, in megabytes, that each site 
hosts).  Comparing the ratio of unique 
external pages to a site’s volume 
indicates how much any given site is 
relying on external and self-produced 
content.  In the network map of Egypt’s 
online political sphere, each dot 
represents an external link originating 
from the political parties’ Websites. 
When two dots connect, it is a site that 
two parties linked to and any links 
Figure 5: Structure and Content of Egypt’s Online Political Sphere, November 2010 
 
Note: See Appendix for technical details.  
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position political parties closer together 
based on the program’s algorithm. We 
can see the clear arrangement around 
blogs and state-run media sites. 
 
In May 2011, Western social media and 
news outlets are still at the center of the 
online Egyptian political network.  The 
majority of common links between 
Egypt’s political parties are commercial, 
Western sites.  Most central, we see: 
Facebook, Google, YouTube, CNN, 
Yahoo!, Blogger, BBC, Flickr, Twitter and 
Wordpress.  Notably, none of the 
Websites crawled in November 2010 
linked to al Jazeera, and there were only 
six outgoing links to al Jazeera when the 
crawl was repeated in May 2011.   
 
The results of the May 2011 network 
generation show that the same Western 
media are still present, but are now 
oriented along the periphery of the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s Websites. And 
while links to Western media are found 
on many Egyptian sites, the Muslim 
Brotherhood provides a surprising 
amount of new content in both its 
Arabic and English language sites.  In 
terms of pages, the Arabic version grew 
Figure 6: Structure and Content of Egypt’s Online Political Sphere, May 2011 
 
Note: See Appendix for technical details.  
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by almost 60 percent, and in terms of 
size it more than tripled. Considering 
how large the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Arabic language Website is, it is 
interesting to note how relatively few 
links it makes to outside news sources 
or content from other political actors.  
 
The National Democratic Party's 
Website [ndp.org.eg] is no longer in 
service. The last publicly available 
versions of the site were cached in 
Google's search engine on February 26, 
2011.  There is no redirect, so it 
appears that the host servers have 
been taken offline.  The April 6 
Movement, which had a central role in 
the uprising, barely existed as a 
standalone URL in November 2010 
because most of its content was not on 
its own Website but almost exclusively 
on social networking platforms like 
Facebook and Twitter.  The National 
Association for Change and the National 
Democratic Party ceased to exist after 
the uprising.  
 
The Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Changing Online Content 
Even today, Facebook remains one of 
the most central nodes in Egyptian 
networks of political information.  In 
November 2010, before the political 
uprising, the Websites of major political 
actors had more links to Facebook and 
other Western media than they had to 
each other. By May 2011, Facebook 
was still central, but with Mubarak’s 
departure, the volume of digital content 
produced by the Muslim Brotherhood 
has come to dominate these networks. 
 
The most significant change in how 
political parties operate online involves 
two of the Websites of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  In November 2010 these 
two Websites had 10,495 pages, with 
962 outgoing links and 333 megabytes 
of content.  By May 2011 this had 
evolved to 12,527 pages, 806 links and 
845 megabytes of content. In other 
words, the number of Web pages had 
grown by 19 percent, the number of 
outgoing links had diminished by 16 
percent, and the volume of content had 
grown by 154 percent. 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood presence on 
English and Arabic Websites was 
dominant in Egypt’s online political 
sphere before the November elections 
began and has grown significantly since 
then, particularly with respect to 
content. The Brotherhood's English site 
links to much more external content 
than its Arabic site, but it is a smaller 
site in terms of hosted content. This 
may indicate that when seeking to 
inform their English-speaking audience, 
the Muslim Brotherhood provides more 
links to external content to build 
legitimacy. This may also indicate that 
there is more English content than 
Arabic content available to link to.  The 
Arabic version of the site has fewer 
external links (90 percent fewer) and 
more hosted content (159 percent 
more) than the English version. 
 
The Muslim Brotherhood is actively 
developing its own social media sphere, 
with ikhwantube.com and ikhwanbook 
and ikhwanwikitube.com — Websites 
that offer much of the functionality of 
Western namesakes like YouTube and 
Facebook.  As regional experts might 
expect, the Muslim Brotherhood and 
Communist Party of Egypt share a 
number of links to the same kinds of 
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content. Both parties were the major 
opponents to Mubarak’s ruling National 
Democratic Party. Since the November 
2010 elections, both parties have 
increased the amount of content they 
have online. 
 
Viral Videos Spread the 
Freedom Meme 
YouTube became a particularly 
important tool for spreading news and 
information of Egypt’s uprising—in the 
form of user-generated videos — around 
the world.  Our research identifies the 
top viral videos as of June 2011 (see 
Appendix for basic statistics ).  While it 
is difficult to measure the precise 
impact of these videos on audiences, 
some images of suffering certainly 
would have spurred protests and 
heightened moral outrage. 
 
The first significant Egyptian video went 
viral on January 25, 2011.  The video 
depicts thousands of protesters 
converging on Tahrir Square.  The 
images are captured by an amateur 
cameraman looking out of a building 
near the main road.  Based on the 
metadata reported on the uploader’s 
YouTube account, the video was 
distributed by an account registered as 
located in the United States.  Since 
then, this video has accumulated more 
than 600,000 views.  Based on tracking 
of the embed code, it is most likely that 
the video received popular attention 
after being posted on AllMania.com, a 
sports commentary site that has 
experienced a 600 percent increase in 
traffic in January 2011. 
 
RussiaToday’s YouTube channel 
contributed 5 of the top-20 viral videos, 
totaling 1,200,000 cumulative views.  
These videos were from citizen 
journalists and included live footage 
rebroadcasted through the news 
agency’s outlets.  Al Jazeera English’s 
YouTube channel similarly contributed 
three videos, totaling more than 
300,000 views.  Reuters’s YouTube 
channel contributed one video totaling 
more than 200,000 views.  
 
There were four major types of content 
that typified Egyptian viral videos: raw 
protest and mobilization footage; citizen 
commentary; political punditry; and 
“soundtracks for the revolution.” Raw 
protest and mobilization footage was 
the most common, totaling nearly 5.5 
million views from 23 videos.  One video 
featured a detailed 20-minute dialogue 
between a religious scholar and political 
philosopher about the future of Egypt, 
totaling 100,000 views.  Another 
featured a home-made video with a 
young girl’s commentary about political 
events, totaling 275,000 views.  But the 
most popular video, a music video, was 
heralded as a soundtrack to the 
revolution and served as a rallying cry of 
support for the Egyptian peoples’ 
protests.  This music video was the 
single most popular viral video for the 
Egyptian revolution, uploaded on 
January 27, and accounted for 25 
percent of the top-20 video views.  A list 
of the most prominent viral videos 
about the political uprising in Egypt 
appears in the Appendix. 
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Conclusions 
Social media played a crucial role in the 
political uprising in Tunisia and Egypt.  
Using original data from multiple social 
media sources, we can offer some 
concrete conclusions about what that 
role was.  First, social media played a 
central role in shaping political debates 
in the Arab spring.  Second, a spike in 
online revolutionary conversations often 
preceded major events on the ground.  
Third, social media helped spread 
democratic ideas across international 
borders.   
 
Democratization movements existed in 
North Africa and the Middle East long 
before technologies such as mobile 
phones, the Internet, and social media 
came to the region.  However, with 
these technologies people who share an 
interest in democracy learned to build 
extensive networks, create social 
capital, and organize political action.  In 
both Tunisia and Egypt, these virtual 
networks materialized in the streets in 
early 2011 to help bring down two long-
standing dictators. 
 
Anecdotally, we know that social media 
played an important role at key 
moments in the events of this year.  But 
what are the big-picture trends in social 
media use that explain why public 
demand for democratic reform rose 
now, and why events unfolded the way 
they did?  Our unique datasets reveal 
much about the role of different kinds of 
social media.  The Tunisian blogosphere 
provided space for open political 
dialogue about regime corruption and 
the potential for political change.  
Twitter relayed stories of successful 
mobilization within and between 
countries.  Facebook functioned as a 
central node in networks of political 
discontent in Egypt.  During the 
protests, YouTube and other video 
archiving centers allowed citizen 
journalists, using mobile phone 
cameras and consumer electronics, to 
broadcast stories that the mainstream 
media could not or did not want to 
cover. 
 
Social media alone did not cause 
political upheaval in North Africa.  But 
information technologies — including 
mobile phones and the Internet — 
altered the capacity of citizens and civil 
society actors to affect domestic 
politics.  Social media, such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, have 
several kinds of impact on local systems 
of political communication. First, social 
media provides new opportunities and 
new tools for social movements to 
respond to conditions in their countries.  
It is clear that the ability to produce and 
consume political content, independent 
of social elites, is important because 
the public sense of shared grievances 
and potential for change can develop 
rapidly.  Second, social media fosters 
transnational links between individuals 
and groups.  This means that network 
ties form between international and 
local democratization movements, and 
that compelling stories, told in short text 
messages or long video documentaries, 
circulate around the region.  The 
inspiration of success in Tunisia was not 
just a fast-spreading contagion, for civil 
society leaders in neighboring countries 
also learned effective strategies of 
successful movement organizing 
through social media. 
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Social movements are traditionally 
defined as collective challenges, based 
on shared purposes, social solidarity, 
and sustained interactions with elites, 
opponents and authorities.  They 
support a public claim against target 
authorities and engage in political 
action by forming coalitions, organizing 
public meetings and demonstrations, 
and using the media to highlight their 
claims.  Through such demonstrations 
and media use, social movements 
display their unity, numbers and 
commitment.  Social media, social 
networking applications, and consumer 
electronics have not changed the 
purpose of social movement organizing 
— economic opportunity and political 
voice are still the shared goals of social 
movements.  
 
But in North Africa and the Middle East, 
relatively new youth movements have 
been surprised by the speed, size and 
success of protests they have organized 
over social networking Websites.  Over 
several years they have found their 
political voice online and have held their 
meetings virtually.  Each of the dictators 
in these countries has long had many 
political enemies, but they were a 
fragmented group of opponents.  Now 
these opponents do more than use 
broadcast media to highlight their 
claims.  They use social media to 
identify goals, build solidarity, and 
organize demonstrations.  During the 
Arab Spring, individuals demonstrated 
their desire for freedom through social 
media, and social media became a 
critical part of the toolkit used to 
achieve that freedom. 
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Methods Appendix  
Analyzing Twitter Data 
The data for Figures 1, 3 and 5, comes 
from the analysis of Twitter feeds. This 
project is among the first to analyze the 
flow of text messages about the 
potential and strategy of 
democratization movements among 
multiple countries. In addition, we 
figured out how to distinguish between 
domestic, regional, and international 
contributors to the growing online 
consciousness about political crisis. 
Demonstrating Twitter’s impact on 
regional conversations is an important 
contribution but was technically 
challenging. We processed more than 3 
million tweets for their use of hashtags 
about events in North Africa and the 
Middle East. We purchased cloud 
computing time from Amazon to speed 
up the text analysis, and wrote 
automated scripts for identifying the 
relevant tweets. A significant number of 
the tweets provide longitude and 
latitude information, and that 
information was automatically 
converted into country location. Finally, 
we hired a translator to help with texts 
and location information that is in 
Arabic, French, Hebrew and Turkish. 
 
This dataset was created using the 
Twitter archiving service 
TwapperKeeper 
(http://twapperkeeper.com/) to capture 
the flow of tweets from the Twitter 
Search API for Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, 
Morocco and Yemen. The hashtags 
analyzed, in order, were “#algeria”, 
“#egypt”, “#feb14”, “#morocco”, 
“#sidibouzid” and “#yemen.” Since 
these archives were initiated by 
different users at different times, they 
do not all cover the same time period. 
The earliest, #sidibouzid, begins on 
January 14, 2011, and the last tweets 
(in multiple hashtags) occur on March 
24, 2011. TwapperKeeper experienced 
system overloading at several times 
during this duration, resulting in 
coverage gaps within some of the 
archives. But even for archives with no 
gaps, it is highly unlikely that 
TwapperKeeper’s archive captured all 
relevant tweets due to limitations 
imposed by Twitter. All six archives 
combined contain a total of 3,142,621 
tweets, some of which undoubtedly 
overlap because each tweet could 
contain multiple hashtags. Over 75 
percent of these (2,363,139) are from 
#egypt. This method omits some 
unknown number of in-region tweeters 
due to blank location fields, deleted 
accounts, and uninterpretable 
information in the fields. 
 
Twitter changed its terms of service on 
March 20, 2011, to disallow public 
sharing of tweets. The archives 
analyzed in this report were queued for 
downloading from TwapperKeeper on 
March 19, 2011, but due to the backlog 
of similar requests from other users, the 
downloads did not become available 
until several days later (which is why 
some of them include tweets added 
after March 20). The archive dates for 
specific hashtags vary, and the earliest 
data points come from #egypt on 
January 5, 2011. All tracking ends 
March 20, 2011 due to Twitter’s terms 
of service change. TwapperKeeper, the 
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The hashtag archives included a wide 
array of metadata along with each 
tweet, including the author’s name, the 
GMT time it was posted, and the 
application used to send it, among other 
information. However, authors’ self-
reported location field was not included. 
To gather this, a list of unique users 
from each hashtag was created via a 
custom PHP script. Each list was then 
used as an input into a second PHP 
script which automatically saved each 
user’s location field from the Twitter 
REST API. Due to restrictions on the 
number of requests that can be sent to 
Twitter’s REST API per hour, the user 
locations had to be collected one 
archive at a time. Location collection for 
the largest hashtags took longer than a 
day, with the exact amount of time 
depending on the number of unique 
users that contributed to it. Ultimately, 
between 25 percent and 40 percent of 
the unique users in each archive lacked 
any location data. Reasons for this 
included simply leaving the field blank, 
deleting one’s account, or having it 
suspended due to misuse. 
 
Once this script had finished collecting 
the location fields for all unique users 
from each hashtag archive, each data 
file was subjected to a word filter that 
attempted to automatically classify each 
user-provided location into one of four 
categories: (1) within the hashtag 
country; (2) within the broader Arabic 
region; (3) outside both the country and 
the Arabic region; and (4) no provided 
location. The first two filters consisted of 
a simple string-matching search pattern 
that sought the English name of each 
country along with the names of the top 
five cities by population in each country. 
The sole exception to this was for 
countries with less than 5 percent 
Internet penetration, for which only the 
capital city was used in addition to the 
country name. Because many user-
provided locations came in the form of 
latitude-longitude coordinates or were 
written in other languages, we decided 
to convert these into English before 
applying the filter. Google’s reverse 
geocoding service was used for the 
former and Google Translate was used 
for locations written in Arabic script. 
Manually reading the translated 
locations, we were able to identify 
additional city names within the Arabic 
region that recurred often, so we added 
these to the word filter. 
 
The above procedure resulted in a 
dataset for each archive that consisted 
of each unique username and its 
category ID as determined by the word 
filter. To combine the category IDs with 
the full tweet data, each pair of archive 
files (consisting of one full tweet set and 
one list of unique names and category 
IDs) was loaded into a MySQL database 
hosted on a virtual Linux computer 
hosted by Amazon’s commercial cloud. 
Custom SQL queries were used to 
automatically graft each unique user’s 
location to each appearance of that 
user within the archive. Another SQL 
query tallied the number of tweets in 
each full archive classified as coming 
from a user in the hashtag country, in 
the broader Arabic region, outside of the 
country and region, and with no 
location. These summaries were 
aggregated by date and used to create 
time-series charts showing the posting 
dynamics of each location category. 
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Analyzing the Tunisian 
Blogosphere 
The data for Figure 2 comes from our 
analysis of the Tunisian blogosphere. 
This dataset was created using the 
eCairn Conversation archiving and 
analysis service. The tool was used to 
capture the flow of information through 
blog posts from RSS feeds for Tunisia’s 
key blogs. The captured data-streams 
begin on November 20, 2011, and end 
on May 15, 2011. A total of 475 key 
Tunisian blogs contributed a total of 
26,000 posts during this period. A 
number of languages are represented in 
the Tunisian blogosphere, including: 
Arabic, French, and English.  We were 
able to analyze blog centrality through 
eCairn Conversation, and 17 of 475 
blogs were identified as the main 
information gateways for the Tunisian 
blogosphere. In order of centrality, they 
are: Tunisie Blogs; Wallada; 
Extravaganza; Tn-Bloggers; Boukornine; 
?????? ?????????? ????; Venus et Moi; Barbach; 
Tuniblogs; Notes; Carpe Diem; 
L’universe de Narwas; ??????????????????; 
Desenchantee; ???????? ?????????????????????????; Mon 
Massir; and Blogger. These 17 blogs 
(3.6 percent of the Tunisian national 
blogosphere) were linked to the 
remaining sphere of 475 blogs, of which 
76 (16 percent) were located in a 
medium level of network centrality, 262 
(55.1 percent) were in low network 
centrality; and 120 (25.2 percent) were 
network outliers and did not link to or 
share much dialogue with the rest of the 
Tunisian blogosphere.  
 
Almost all of the 17 core blogs in the 
Tunisian blogosphere have been hosted 
within Tunisia.  According to IP 
addresses, the cities of Tunis and al-
Hammah have had the most prominent 
bloggers. The most central blogs in 
Tunis were El Fan, Tuniscope, and 
Tekino (all had medium network 
centrality in the larger Tunisian 
blogosphere). The most central blogs in 
al-Hammah were Tunisie Blogs, Tn-
Bloggers, and Barbach (all had high 
network centrality in the larger Tunisian 
blogosphere). Interestingly, al-Hammah 
was a more critical location for the 
Tunisian blogosphere than Tunis.  In 
addition, there have been several 
prominent Tunisian blogs maintained by 
people in the Tunisian diaspora.  For 
example, the blogs Stupeur, Houblog, 
Arabasta, and Chroniques Absurdes 
were located in Montreal or Paris, 
belonged mostly to Tunisian expatriates, 
and were key mid-level blogs in the 
Tunisian national blogosphere. 
 
The keywords identified for the analysis 
were determined using eCairn’s 
conversation analyzer. The application 
used text search and identification 
algorithms to assess word frequencies 
and proximate phrases. This allowed us 
to specify Ben Ali, Bouazizi, Economie, 
Islam, Revolution, and Liberty, as 
important conversation items in the 
Tunisian national blogosphere. After 
identifying important keywords, we 
reverse-analyzed their presence through 
time-series analysis. By sub-selecting 
the portions of the blogosphere which 
frequently mentioned different key 
words, we were able to investigate their 
particular network-structures. For 
example, the keywords appearing less 
frequently (e.g., Islam) had less network 
heterogeneity and were composed of 
less and mostly low-influence blogs. In 
contrast, blogs mentioning popular 
keywords (e.g., Revolution) had more 
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network heterogeneity, were composed 
of larger, more diverse, and more high-
level influence blogs driving those 
conversations. Put more simply, the 
networks of blogs within the Tunisian 
national blogosphere that were more 
diverse, cross-linked with others, and 
were key information gates, were able 
to drive different topics of conversation 
more successfully than smaller and 
more homogeneous blog networks. 
 
Analyzing the Structure of 
the Egyptian Political Web 
A comprehensive list of Egypt’s political 
party and political pressure group data 
was built using both the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook, 
Wikipedia, and some specialized 
Egyptian political blogs anticipating that 
this combination of “official” and 
“unofficial” data could bring major and 
minor, new and established parties to 
the list. Several search engines and 
media databases were consulted to 
confirm the URLs for parties that had 
Websites. 
 
In the pre-uprising data set, a total of 
1,332 external links were found across 
10 active Websites, of which 1,225 
were unique and 102 were linked to by 
more than one site. In the post-Mubarak 
data set, a total of 927 external links 
were found across 9 active Websites, of 
which, 828 were unique and 99 were 
linked to by more than one site. We 
searched for party Websites in Arabic, in 
English transliterations of Arabic party 
names, and for the official English 
names of parties. 
 
To analyze the structure, Web Data 
Extractor crawled each political party’s 
URLs and extracted all external-facing 
URLs on the entire directory. All links 
from the first data set were collected by 
Web Data Extractor from November 11-
13, 2010 and all links from the second 
data set were collected between May 3-
6, 2011. An XML based add-in for 
Microsoft Excel 2007 called NodeXL, 
developed by a team funded by 
Microsoft Research, was used to create 
network maps with the data like that 
pulled from Web Data Extractor. NodeXL 
generated the Network Linkage Map 
between Political Parties in Egypt in 
Figures 5 and 6. An arrangement of 
nodes and clusters, the map is based 
on the Harel-Koren algorithm, which 
groups the nodes (individual sites as 
dots) based on common external links 
and distributes to avoid crossover.  
 
Analyzing Viral Videos from 
YouTube 
Between May 16 and 20, 2011, the 
most prominent videos loaded into 
YouTube with the keyword “Egypt” were 
hand coded for author, viewing, and 
creation date information. The most 
viral videos on YouTube are identified in 
Table 2, ordered by number of views 
and then date of uploading. 
 




Table 2: Viral Video Content From Egyptians, By Upload Date and Number of Viewers 
Title Channel Views Date 
Protest in Egypt - Jan 25, 2011  lukasjakubicka 676,701 25-Jan-11 
Day of anger in Egypt ReutersVideo 217,518 25-Jan-11 
Egypt's Protests Day of Anger Riots 25 Jan 2011 
Demonstrations Rare Raw Footage 
AusNetwork 110,162 25-Jan-11 
The Most AMAZING video on the Internet #Egypt #jan25  hadi15 2,127,384 27-Jan-11 
Man Shot in Egypt NeroAlex1988 154,823 27-Jan-11 
Egypt Unrest: Video of police killing teen protester, riots 
aftermath  
RussiaToday 397,099 28-Jan-11 
28th Jan. 2011 - Storyful - Egypt Cairo uprising protest 
video - Mohamed Ibrahim Elmasry  
storyful 285,628 28-Jan-11 
Demanding change in Egypt AlJazeeraEnglish 111,908 28-Jan-11 
Egyptians renew protests after curfew AlJazeeraEnglish 106,191 28-Jan-11 
Juju's message to Mubarak  oneholysinner 275,302 29-Jan-11 
Video of Egypt's bloody clashes as protesters defy curfew 
in Cairo 
RussiaToday 204,736 30-Jan-11 
Video of fighter jets & choppers over Cairo as military 
tries to take control 
RussiaToday 167,422 30-Jan-11 
Egyptian Revolution 2011 COMPLETE. World MUST 
MUST watch this. Freedom for All! 
eyeinsidefilm 484,043 1-Feb-11 
'March of Millions' in Cairo as Egypt riots death toll 
reaches 300 
RussiaToday 123,965 1-Feb-11 
Video of fierce Egypt clashes as pro-govt crowds attack 
anti-Mubarak protesters 
RussiaToday 322,708 2-Feb-11 
Fourth Horseman (death) Egyptian riots. Full Original 
Video 
PunkersTV 1,551,796 3-Feb-11 
The fourth horseman (of Death) at the Egypt protests FooledToaster 150,532 3-Feb-11 
Hosni Mubarak, a citizen of the people of Egypt at the 
end of wisdom 
shaghelhom 139,526 4-Feb-11 
Riz Khan - Tariq Ramadan and Slavoj Zizek on the future 
of Egyptian politics  
AlJazeeraEnglish 107,769 4-Feb-11 
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